... please stop.
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72 years ago today, the US dropped an atomic bomb on Nagasaki, Japan
- Thread starter GK86
- Start date
... please stop.
This is not true. (bolded)
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-...s/csi-studies/studies/vol46no3/article07.html
Leaflets were dropped on 33 Japanese cities, and the government was told what was going to happen. Please don't intentionally spread information that the bomb was dropped 100% without warning to the people of Japan.
NHarmonic.
Member
I agree. This feels too much like judging history from the winner's perspective.
It was the perfect way to test these new weapons, there's no denying about that.
It might have been the lesser evil, but people fiercely defending this choice of you know, fucking evaporating 2 cities filled with innocent people, still strikes me as tasteless. WW2 showed us a world and the actions of humanity that can't make anyone feel proud, tbh.
I've been in Hiroshima Memorial too, and as you may know because you were too, no one there (or almost no one) has any grudge against the US, they know no one thinks it was good. No one (but idiots) were happy that it happened, everyone understand it was one of the most tragic moments in WW2.
The discussion isn't about if it was good or bad but if it was posible to stop the war without an horrible number of civilians death, and sadly it pretty much wasn't.
Also, as much as I hate that nuclear weapons exists, it's a big component on why it's improbable to have a WW3. No one want to be the one that basically destroy society as we know.
Please point out who said it was a good thing. I see people saying an option was picked out a bunch of horrible ones.
I think the wider point they're trying to make when you include the following line is that it wasn't nessasary, or at least the bombing of Nagasaki wasn't. Historians generally agree with this point and look at the Red invasion marking the game over.
Uh, no they don't at all.
Japan functionally lost the war at the Battle of Leyte Gulf (really they lost it earlier, but this is when the IJN truly died) which was October 23-26, 1944. They continued the war for an additional 10 months all in a desperate attempt to save their territories where war crimes were being committed. Some of the regime were ready to surrender, (hell the IJN didn't want the war in the first place), but there was definitely no consensus for them to surrender.
If MacArthur forced the removal of imperial authority, WW2 wouldn't have ended after the second bombing.
If MacArthur forced the removal of imperial authority, WW2 wouldn't have ended after the second bombing.
Trojita
Rapid Response Threadmaker
I think Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's book when discussing the premise that the atomic bombs forced Japan's surrender (it can be argued that it did not) is worth a read.
http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674022416&content=reviews
http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674022416&content=reviews
Dubbedinenglish
Banned
It's a very contested point. I used to believe it but I read about the only battle that the Soviets lost more men in Manchuria, which is the invasion of the Kuril Islands, curiously an amphibious assault. Plays to the side of saying the Red Army could assault land just fine but were ill equipped when it came to amphibious landings, which fighting Japan would've needed.
Zevenberge
Member
Missed the leaflets, thank you.
"The best revenge against your worst opponent is to forgive them." It is no use trying to start a never ending spiral of doom, so the best thing you can do is to stop the battle and forgive your opponent. Therefore the message of both Memorial museums (Nagasaki and Hiroshima are different ones with a very distinct way of sending their message) is not to blame the US, but to pray "never again".
"The best revenge against your worst opponent is to forgive them." It is no use trying to start a never ending spiral of doom, so the best thing you can do is to stop the battle and forgive your opponent. Therefore the message of both Memorial museums (Nagasaki and Hiroshima are different ones with a very distinct way of sending their message) is not to blame the US, but to pray "never again".
That is also the reason why everyone states "Hiroshima is understandable". Nagasaki, however, is a different story. It is sometimes also seen as the first move in the cold war towards Russia, rather than the finishing move in WWII.
If you take Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's view, both the bombs and the Soviet invasion took them by surprise. It was a shock to the Supreme Council. The last thing they wanted was a Red occupation given what the Soviets had already done before along with the mass rapes that occurred. It was far more favourable to surrender to Truman.
In addition, Japanese scientists were only able to report back in the very same day of the Soviet invasion and the attack on Nagasaki.
Between traditionalists, consensus and revisionists, it's not controversial to state that most historians agree that the second bomb wasn't nessesary. There is a compelling argument to be made.
Look up Peter Kuznick and Gar Alperovitz and if you're still of the same opinion that the consensus is that the bombing of Nagasaki was nessasary then there is some dishonestly floating around here.
KillerMan91
Member
Yeah. Both Germany and Japan should have surrendered like half year before they did as they had essentially lost the war already and were just sacrificing their own citizens for nothing. Millions of lives would had been saved. Final months in both theaters were totally pointless human slaughter.
Trojita
Rapid Response Threadmaker
I already am aware of all the names you listed. I was just looking at a H-Diplo round table involving them. These are minority views on alternative explanations on the ending of the pacific theater.
Hexa
Member
That's a perspective I've never seen before actually. It's usually that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were both motivated by wanting to take control of Japan before the Soviets got involved. Nagasaki was planned before the Soviet invasion, so I don't see how the situation changed compared to Hiroshima such that such a judgment would apply to one but not the other. As for both, while I have no doubt it was considered, which there is evidence for, the notes and letters from Truman and his advisors show pretty clearly that wasn't the main reason or even one of the main reasons.
There are lots of good documentaries
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=7sB0hVso2a4
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=tHZQQGNuBPU
Nobody said there were no arguments to be made. Your assertion that the majority agree with your view is what is poppycock.
I was hasty with my use of consensus when there isn't one. To state that these are minority views is dismissive and actually quite preposterous. Regardless, Cocaloch (an actual historian) had some interesting posts from a few pages back that I'm sure you'd both be interested in.
YesThatGuy
Banned
Biggest, deadliest terrorist acts in history.
LordKasual
Banned
Worth stating that the nukes the US has today are about 80x stronger than Fat Man.
80 times
I think anyone who truly understands these weapons would be against the Japanese nukings, even in retrospect.
80 times
I think anyone who truly understands these weapons would be against the Japanese nukings, even in retrospect.
"Without a doubt, no, there were no leaflets dropped on them to warn them specifically about the atomic bombings. For Hiroshima they would simply not have done such a thing the entire point of the bomb was to be a massive, secret surprise, and warning would not be compatible with that. "
"All of the sites that assert that there were specific atomic bomb warning leaflets dropped appear to be based on a basic misconception about the difference between them writing up a leaflet after Hiroshima (a lot of them have bad dates on them, e.g. "circa August 6th", which imply they dropped them on or before Hiroshima, but the contents of the leaflets refer to things that happened after the Hiroshima attack) and actually dropping them. The 1946 report clarifies that while they did prepare a leaflet, they did not end up dropping it until after Nagasaki for logistical reasons."
I always thought they did actually drop the leaflets.. the more you know!
"All of the sites that assert that there were specific atomic bomb warning leaflets dropped appear to be based on a basic misconception about the difference between them writing up a leaflet after Hiroshima (a lot of them have bad dates on them, e.g. "circa August 6th", which imply they dropped them on or before Hiroshima, but the contents of the leaflets refer to things that happened after the Hiroshima attack) and actually dropping them. The 1946 report clarifies that while they did prepare a leaflet, they did not end up dropping it until after Nagasaki for logistical reasons."
I always thought they did actually drop the leaflets.. the more you know!
Nice to warn people to leave Nagasaki AFTER you already bomb it.
I'd like to see a source for this "no leaflet" position. Every source I can find, which includes scans and copy of the leaflets dropped, has record that they were dropped on August 1st over 33 Japanese cities. Not to mention that the government of Japan was told many times what was going to happen.
Hexa
Member
Those leaflets, the LeMay leaflets, were dropped. However, they weren't specific to the atom bomb, listing a while bunch of cities, most of which were destroyed by firebombings.
http://www.atomicheritage.org/key-documents/warning-leaflets
http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/wp-c...y-Psychological-Warfare-Manhattan-Project.pdf
I think they still dropped the default fire bombing one at hiroshima, just not the one about the atomic bomb.
I just happened upon this at https://www.reddit.com/r/todayilear...without_the_atomic_bomb_the_invasion_plan_of/ while reading about the war.
"The historical record is unclear, but it seems as though these leaflets did not make it to Nagasaki until after it, too, had been hit by an atomic bomb." Well that probably wasn't much help..
I think they still dropped the default fire bombing one at hiroshima, just not the one about the atomic bomb.
I just happened upon this at https://www.reddit.com/r/todayilear...without_the_atomic_bomb_the_invasion_plan_of/ while reading about the war.
"The historical record is unclear, but it seems as though these leaflets did not make it to Nagasaki until after it, too, had been hit by an atomic bomb." Well that probably wasn't much help..
Hexa
Member
The atom bomb itself was meant to be a surprise. The shock value and mystery were supposed to be crucial aspects of convincing the Japanese leadership to surrender.
The leaflets were more for the sake of psychological warfare than being an actual warning. They basically amounted to saying that the US would destroy everywhere the military has presence in Japan so all civilians should leave. This did result in hampering the Japanese war effort. But with total war, the military pretty much has a presence everywhere, so telling them to leave isn't exactly very useful. Where are they supposed to go?
Providing specific warnings with dates and exact locations on bombings isn't an option because then the military would also interfere, moving troops and POW and such.
Say you believe they are terrorist attacks. There were deadlier fire bombing campaigns. There's also the holocaust.
Technically, MacArthur had the authority to remove and prosecute Hirohito. He just decided not to because he knew better than anyone else.
The Soviet plans only went so far as to invade Hokkaido. The Japanese defenses there were very weak, and it's plausible that they could have succeeded.
What the real shock was that the Soviets would attack Japan at all; they didn't declare war until 8-August-1945, and only a few months earlier, the two countries had a non-Aggression Pact going. Everyone knew that any chance of avoiding a military defeat was impossible by 1945, but the hardliners were holding onto the hope of a limited surrender negotiated through the Soviet Union. Once the USSR became an enemy, that was no longer plausible, and it's probably the biggest contributor to the Japanese surrender.
The problem is that leaflets don't mean anything. Enemy powers drop leaflets all the time, and the primary purpose of them is propaganda. No one is going to change their behavior just because they got something like this.
Hasegawa is pretty critical of the traditionalist stance. He's also not a revisionist and thus while my original statement implying consensus is wrong, the revisionist stance isn't a minority viewpoint. It has a number of very reputable historians arguing the case. And then you have consensus historians.
If you want to quote Hasegawa then here's one from The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals.
.Link
What answer do you think they will learn?
I actually agree with this in principle, because I think if people had better history education then most of them would realize that they aren't equipped to offer anything meaningful to the discussion. But even very few upper level college classes actually are able to spend much time with teaching students how to think historically outside of the very best institutions, so even this is a moot point.
I think these posts are actually incredibly dismissive, because what people are really getting at is that everyone that disagrees with your side of the argument needs to go back to basic history where they will find the answer. But that answer isn't to be found in high school level textbook style history.
After the first several threads I've completely give up on getting people to actually change their minds about the substance of events, but it'd be nice if we could get people that honestly know very little besides having maybe read a pop history or two and been told by their dad what happened to recognize that they really don't know even to say anything meaningful about the state of the discussion. It's certainly ridiculous how many people, the vast majority of whom I assume are not historians of any field, are making claims about what historians as a community are saying.
Both Hasegawa and the revisionist school seem to lack a great of evidence to support their case.
A government survey after the fact is quite weak, and the other points were addressed in the quote I responded.
That's not simply protecting the Emperor.
As for Hasegawa
I'd have to agree with the critics.
http://www.atomicheritage.org/history/debate-over-japanese-surrender
If there is more compelling evidence, I'd be happy to read it. Its been a while since I read any book on the bombing, so the specific facts are a bit hazy.
Are you a historian? If not then I want to know how frequently you feel the need to inform physicists that they don't have enough evidence to say whatever they are saying in a paper.
Also do you not find it odd at all to use some random webpage from a group called the Atomic Heritage Foundation to make arguments about what historians as a group are saying and believe? Also you seem to be quoting it in a misleading way, that webpage, clearly not really an authority anyway, is even pointing out that the issue is contentious with ongoing debate among historians.
Majored in history, pursued a Doctorate in history for a year, and am now a social studies teacher.
But I apologize for all of us plebs for daring to have the temerity to argue about historical arguments and evidence without proper qualifications. Heaven forbid!
Would you do that to a physicist?
Act offended all you want, but this is the crux of a much larger problem.
If you had said "I don't like _____'s argument because," and then given a decent number of well thought out issues with it, I wouldn't have minded. But you didn't. You just declared that a historian didn't meet your standard of evidence based solely on a random webpage, which wasn't even agreeing with your premise.
Seems to suggest an attack with previous notice, also people are fallible; to think a committee ultimately knows the outcome of something smacks in the face of every tactical decision ever made in the entire history of warfare. If people actually knew better there would be a lot less mistakes happening.
I understand the cost thing, sadly.
I have little understanding of physics, so no.
But apparently, according to you, us plebs don't have the ability to think critically about arguments or evidence and we should just leave it up to our betters.
I have respected your obviously vast historical knowledge, but you are coming across right now as an elitist prick who is offended that people you deem unqualified are daring to question the work of proper historians like you.
I really hope you don't take this attitude into your teaching or when you become a professor...
Captain Tuttle
Member
I'm an American and I had to read Hiroshima in 8th grade
https://www.amazon.com/dp/8087888820/?tag=neogaf0e-20
Definitely not a pro-bomb book. This was in the 80's and at the height of The Cold War, shit was scary, I was convinced that I wouldn't graduate High School because there was going to be a nuclear war.
I have already admitted that it has been too long since I read Hasegawa's book and too long since I read a book on the atomic bombing to go into specifics. While I thought Hawegawa's book was interesting, my takeaway was similar to the critics in that quote so I used it. I didn't find the argument and evidence he used about the incredible importance of the soviet invasion to be convincing. I thought it was a factor, but not to the point that he was arguing.
But you've unilaterally decided your qualified enough to dismiss academic historians totally. Why is that? If you had majored in physics as an undergrad do you think you would have felt comfortable critiquing a physicist? What's different about physics and history that makes you feel more comfortable doing that with history?
That's not what I'm saying, and I was very explicit about my points above at great length. There is a crisis of legitimacy among historians. It's partially due to anti-intellectualism in general, but History seems to have gotten the worst of it in terms of legitimacy. That's partially our fault for not tending our own garden and instead attaching our epistemological legitimacy to other programs, Whiggery, Marxism, "Scientific History", and such. Nonetheless, it is a problem.
Again if you had sat down and made a well reasoned argument about the problems with a historians work that would have been one thing, but you didn't. You just declared it unsound history. Do you not see how it might be a problem if non-experts in pretty much any field could just declare , again not argue, that expert research isn't just wrong, but methodologically flawed?
I understand how this is an upsetting viewpoint to hear. But this,and the related problems of scientist and postitivism, are the most important issues with the popular understanding of history today, and has vast repercussions for not just our understanding of history, but our understanding of almost every single social issue. If you've respected me before, you've seen me post about history before. You've probably seen me engage with other poster's ideas about the past in a less dismissive way. What happened here that is different? It's partially the fact that this question is very pressing, but there's more to it than that.
It's too late for that sorry. But I'm also generally not as direct with my students about this because my students generally just ignore, perhaps more accurately just never hear, what historians, including myself, say. This is also a problem, but far less pressiming, because most of that dismissal comes from not caring about history, not from dismissing the legitimacy of the community of historians.
Then the better way to put that is that is that his evidence wasn't sufficient to convince you. I'm totally fine with that because it's not a value judgement about his methodology.
I feel bad that this is coming off as prickish to you, I really don't mean it that way. But I also see no way to assert that expert communities need to be given epistemological legitimacy over lay people that doesn't sound prickish, because our society's understandings of both equality and epistemology, which I find quite problematic, make the premise itself seem morally wrong. Which is funny, because in effect this is clearly what we already have in society. The issue is that the levels of legitimacy we afford things are all over the place, and most people don't realize what is going on with why they think they know what they know.
petran79
Banned
I recently read this article
The nuclear bomb didn't beat Japan Stalin did
http://uk.businessinsider.com/the-nuclear-bomb-didnt-beat-japan-stalin-did-2017-8
Despite the existence of these three powerful objections, the traditional interpretation still retains a strong hold on many peoples thinking, particularly in the United States. There is real resistance to looking at the facts. But perhaps this should not be surprising. It is worth reminding ourselves how emotionally convenient the traditional explanation of Hiroshima is both for Japan and the United States. Ideas can have persistence because they are true, but unfortunately, they can also persist because they are emotionally satisfying: They fill an important psychic need. For example, at the end of the war the traditional interpretation of Hiroshima helped Japans leaders achieve a number of important political aims, both domestic and international.
Put yourself in the shoes of the emperor. Youve just led your country through a disastrous war. The economy is shattered. Eighty percent of your cities have been bombed and burned. The Army has been pummeled in a string of defeats. The Navy has been decimated and confined to port. Starvation is looming. The war, in short, has been a catastrophe and, worst of all, youve been lying to your people about how bad the situation really is. They will be shocked by news of surrender. So which would you rather do? Admit that you failed badly? Issue a statement that says that you miscalculated spectacularly, made repeated mistakes, and did enormous damage to the nation? Or would you rather blame the loss on an amazing scientific breakthrough that no one could have predicted? At a single stroke, blaming the loss of the war on the atomic bomb swept all the mistakes and misjudgments of the war under the rug. The Bomb was the perfect excuse for having lost the war. No need to apportion blame; no court of enquiry need be held. Japans leaders were able to claim they had done their best. So, at the most general level the Bomb served to deflect blame from Japans leaders.
..................................................................................................
But attributing Japans defeat to the Bomb also served three other specific political purposes. First, it helped to preserve the legitimacy of the emperor. If the war was lost not because of mistakes but because of the enemys unexpected miracle weapon, then the institution of the emperor might continue to find support within Japan.
Second, it appealed to international sympathy. Japan had waged war aggressively, and with particular brutality toward conquered peoples. Its behavior was likely to be condemned by other nations. Being able to recast Japan as a victimized nation one that had been unfairly bombed with a cruel and horrifying instrument of war would help to offset some of the morally repugnant things Japans military had done. Drawing attention to the atomic bombings helped to paint Japan in a more sympathetic light and deflect support for harsh punishment.
Finally, saying that the Bomb won the war would please Japans American victors. The American occupation did not officially end in Japan until 1952, and during that time the United States had the power to change or remake Japanese society as they saw fit. During the early days of the occupation, many Japanese officials worried that the Americans intended to abolish the institution of the emperor. And they had another worry. Many of Japans top government officials knew that they might face war crimes trials (the war crimes trials against Germanys leaders were already underway in Europe when Japan surrendered). Japanese historian Asada Sadao has said that in many of the postwar interviews Japanese officials were obviously anxious to please their American questioners. If the Americans wanted to believe that the Bomb won the war, why disappoint them?
Attributing the end of the war to the atomic bomb served Japans interests in multiple ways. But it also served U.S. interests. If the Bomb won the war, then the perception of U.S. military power would be enhanced, U.S. diplomatic influence in Asia and around the world would increase, and U.S. security would be strengthened. The $2 billion spent to build it would not have been wasted. If, on the other hand, the Soviet entry into the war was what caused Japan to surrender, then the Soviets could claim that they were able to do in four days what the United States was unable to do in four years, and the perception of Soviet military power and Soviet diplomatic influence would be enhanced. And once the Cold War was underway, asserting that the Soviet entry had been the decisive factor would have been tantamount to giving aid and comfort to the enemy.
It is troubling to consider, given the questions raised here, that the evidence of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is at the heart of everything we think about nuclear weapons. This event is the bedrock of the case for the importance of nuclear weapons. It is crucial to their unique status, the notion that the normal rules do not apply to nuclear weapons. It is an important measure of nuclear threats: Trumans threat to visit a rain of ruin on Japan was the first explicit nuclear threat. It is key to the aura of enormous power that surrounds the weapons and makes them so important in international relations.
But what are we to make of all those conclusions if the traditional story of Hiroshima is called into doubt? Hiroshima is the center, the point from which all other claims and assertions radiate out. Yet the story we have been telling ourselves seems pretty far removed from the facts. What are we to think about nuclear weapons if this enormous first accomplishment the miracle of Japans sudden surrender turns out to be a myth?
The nuclear bomb didn't beat Japan Stalin did
http://uk.businessinsider.com/the-nuclear-bomb-didnt-beat-japan-stalin-did-2017-8
Despite the existence of these three powerful objections, the traditional interpretation still retains a strong hold on many peoples thinking, particularly in the United States. There is real resistance to looking at the facts. But perhaps this should not be surprising. It is worth reminding ourselves how emotionally convenient the traditional explanation of Hiroshima is both for Japan and the United States. Ideas can have persistence because they are true, but unfortunately, they can also persist because they are emotionally satisfying: They fill an important psychic need. For example, at the end of the war the traditional interpretation of Hiroshima helped Japans leaders achieve a number of important political aims, both domestic and international.
Put yourself in the shoes of the emperor. Youve just led your country through a disastrous war. The economy is shattered. Eighty percent of your cities have been bombed and burned. The Army has been pummeled in a string of defeats. The Navy has been decimated and confined to port. Starvation is looming. The war, in short, has been a catastrophe and, worst of all, youve been lying to your people about how bad the situation really is. They will be shocked by news of surrender. So which would you rather do? Admit that you failed badly? Issue a statement that says that you miscalculated spectacularly, made repeated mistakes, and did enormous damage to the nation? Or would you rather blame the loss on an amazing scientific breakthrough that no one could have predicted? At a single stroke, blaming the loss of the war on the atomic bomb swept all the mistakes and misjudgments of the war under the rug. The Bomb was the perfect excuse for having lost the war. No need to apportion blame; no court of enquiry need be held. Japans leaders were able to claim they had done their best. So, at the most general level the Bomb served to deflect blame from Japans leaders.
..................................................................................................
But attributing Japans defeat to the Bomb also served three other specific political purposes. First, it helped to preserve the legitimacy of the emperor. If the war was lost not because of mistakes but because of the enemys unexpected miracle weapon, then the institution of the emperor might continue to find support within Japan.
Second, it appealed to international sympathy. Japan had waged war aggressively, and with particular brutality toward conquered peoples. Its behavior was likely to be condemned by other nations. Being able to recast Japan as a victimized nation one that had been unfairly bombed with a cruel and horrifying instrument of war would help to offset some of the morally repugnant things Japans military had done. Drawing attention to the atomic bombings helped to paint Japan in a more sympathetic light and deflect support for harsh punishment.
Finally, saying that the Bomb won the war would please Japans American victors. The American occupation did not officially end in Japan until 1952, and during that time the United States had the power to change or remake Japanese society as they saw fit. During the early days of the occupation, many Japanese officials worried that the Americans intended to abolish the institution of the emperor. And they had another worry. Many of Japans top government officials knew that they might face war crimes trials (the war crimes trials against Germanys leaders were already underway in Europe when Japan surrendered). Japanese historian Asada Sadao has said that in many of the postwar interviews Japanese officials were obviously anxious to please their American questioners. If the Americans wanted to believe that the Bomb won the war, why disappoint them?
Attributing the end of the war to the atomic bomb served Japans interests in multiple ways. But it also served U.S. interests. If the Bomb won the war, then the perception of U.S. military power would be enhanced, U.S. diplomatic influence in Asia and around the world would increase, and U.S. security would be strengthened. The $2 billion spent to build it would not have been wasted. If, on the other hand, the Soviet entry into the war was what caused Japan to surrender, then the Soviets could claim that they were able to do in four days what the United States was unable to do in four years, and the perception of Soviet military power and Soviet diplomatic influence would be enhanced. And once the Cold War was underway, asserting that the Soviet entry had been the decisive factor would have been tantamount to giving aid and comfort to the enemy.
It is troubling to consider, given the questions raised here, that the evidence of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is at the heart of everything we think about nuclear weapons. This event is the bedrock of the case for the importance of nuclear weapons. It is crucial to their unique status, the notion that the normal rules do not apply to nuclear weapons. It is an important measure of nuclear threats: Trumans threat to visit a rain of ruin on Japan was the first explicit nuclear threat. It is key to the aura of enormous power that surrounds the weapons and makes them so important in international relations.
But what are we to make of all those conclusions if the traditional story of Hiroshima is called into doubt? Hiroshima is the center, the point from which all other claims and assertions radiate out. Yet the story we have been telling ourselves seems pretty far removed from the facts. What are we to think about nuclear weapons if this enormous first accomplishment the miracle of Japans sudden surrender turns out to be a myth?
Civilians are still civilians. Gross.
That was what I meant from the beginning, and I used that quote to help illustrate that point. I have no judgement about his methodology because I honestly didn't examine that when I read it. I was reading it for argument and the evidence he used to support that argument. I didn't find it completely convincing.
I can see why my use of that quote would cause some confusion though, especially to a professional historian who likely focuses a lot more on methodology than the rest of us.
Yeah. I mean I would like more people to engage with history and historians, but it's vitally important for me the we create a space in which they can engage with them that works within the parameters of the expert community.
I also see how most lay people, but as a social studies teach I think you would see it too, would miss the stakes involved. It's not just because I want people to trust me when I say things that I want to buttress up the legitimacy of the expert community of historians. I've received many many papers that GAF would certainly not approve of to put it lightly, including gems like comparing slavery to owning a refrigerator. A lot of these more actively damaging narratives take root and grow because historians have increasingly lost legitimacy in the exact same period where historical work has become significantly more nuanced and, at the risk of ironic whiggery, better. In fact, I'd wager part of the reason we've lost legitimacy is because our work is better now, and thus far more often in contention with various received narratives, than it was before.