Like I said in the why Clinton failed thread, successful politicians are people who propose simple solutions to complex problems that reflects the values and beliefs of voters, and do so in a charismatic and interesting way so that an emotional connection develops.
Sure, but being a successful politician means winning. It's not neccisarily doing good things.
Historians are going to need to do something similar if they want their historically supported arguments to reach a wider audience. Changing people isn't going to work because people, in general, will always take the easy way out.
Historians are quite aware of this, I mean that's what pop history is. But that's also why it's so contentious. In simplifying our historical arguments, we don't just lose complexity that is nice, we often lose what's actually going on. If we tell people what they want to hear at the expense of what good historical work is actually showing us , which would at least have to happen sometimes here, then we aren't doing anything but enabling people to believe what they already wanted to believe.
That's a price a large number of historians, including myself, are not willing to pay.
It's difficult to change people, but nudging culture is a better direction is clearly possible even if that too is difficult. And epistemology is always heavily cultural.
I've always like the saying that history is the only field where the presenter, when moving to questions, will generally tell the speaker "thanks for complicating that for me". I don't think that's just a quirk of historians, I think it's actually a totally necessary outlook to do good work in the field.
You aren't going to convince people by better and more nuanced arguments that are supported by facts because that isn't what changes people's minds.
Right, and this is the argument for why we need to increase the sense that historians, as a community, have a privileged access to historical truth.
Because
The only way you are going to change a person's mind on an argument is if you are able to convey a simple, but historically accurate argument in a way that also confirms their values and beliefs.
inevitably means compromising on doing good work, for the sake of people accepting what we have to say. What's the point of getting people to accept what we have to say if it comes at the cost of saying what they want us to say? Received narratives generally at the very best contain a kernel of truth.
I'd also hazard a guess that the reason why historians have increasingly lost legitimacy is that the beliefs and values of people who are educated have become more fractured. I mean, I think there is a reason why that the Dunning School was the consensus for a long time, and that is because the vast majority of white people, historians and lay people, were perfectly fine with an interpretation that essentially supported racism and white supremacy. The few voices who disagreed could be either written off as crackpots or people not worth paying attention to (African Americans).
I'm sure there are a lot of things going on, and this could well be one of them. I do feel that scientism and positivism together are probably the biggest single source of anti-humanities and anti-social sciences sentiment though. Or at least it's the intellectual justification for a widespread anti-intellectualism that seems built into American culture to manifest itself against humanists and social scientists.
The thread about Roman Britain should demonstrate the importance of those two forces. Though in a British and not American context.
That obviously started to change in the 60s, but the beliefs and values of a lot of people didn't change and still hasnt changed. I'd guess that those people still want the great white man narrative in their history because it upholds their identity and values. If they don't get it from academic historians, they can easily find it in conservative 'popular' history works.
Yeah, I certainly agree that historians, and not just Americanists, increasingly moving away from received narratives damaged the appearance of their legitimacy.
But I think that if that legitimacy always depended on saying what people wanted to hear then it was never actually the legitimacy of the historical community. It was the legitimacy of the points being argued flowing to historians. Not the legitimacy of historians and their arguments flowing to whatever thesis they made.